



# Prolonged Village Leadership, Elite Conflict, and Governance Breakdown: A Qualitative Study of Political Dynamics in Sontang Village, Rokan Hulu, Indonesia

Elen Setiyawati<sup>1\*</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Politik, Universitas Riau, Indonesia.



OPEN ACCESS

Dr. Ir. Arman, MM  
Magister Management, STIE Bangkinang  
Indonesia.

\*CORRESPONDENCE

✉ Elen Setiyawati  
email: en\_moet91@yahoo.co.id

COPYRIGHT© 2025  
Elen Setiyawati (Authors)



This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.

## ABSTRACT

**Purpose of the study:** Leadership succession at the village level is a crucial indicator of local democracy, institutional accountability, and public trust. The case of Sontang Village is academically important because its village head remained in office for approximately twenty-one years, despite successive regulatory changes that emphasized direct elections and fixed terms of office. This study aims to explain the political dynamics of the Sontang village head leadership during 1990-2011 and to identify the internal and external factors that shaped the prolonged leadership crisis.

**Methodology:** A qualitative descriptive case-study design was employed. Data were derived from in-depth interviews with village elites, community representatives, village officials, and local government actors, supported by documentary analysis of statutory regulations, village records, and relevant secondary literature. Data were analysed through data reduction, chronological coding, thematic categorisation, triangulation, and interpretive synthesis.

**Results:** The findings show that the political dynamics emerged through four sequential phases: initial acclamation and charismatic legitimacy, extension of authority without competitive election, increasing elite contestation, and conflict escalation leading to the formation of a rival village administration. Internal drivers included centralised leadership style, prolonged concentration of power, declining public service responsiveness, and competing elite interests. External drivers involved inconsistent implementation of village-governance regulations and weak supervision by district and subdistrict authorities.

**Conclusions:** The Sontang case demonstrates that prolonged leadership without institutionalised electoral renewal can erode legitimacy, intensify elite competition, weaken administrative order, and generate dualism in village governance. Strengthening term-limit enforcement, participatory deliberation, public-service accountability, and conflict mediation mechanisms is essential for preventing similar governance crises in rural Indonesia.

## Keywords:

village leadership; local democracy; political conflict; power; village governance; Sontang Village.

## Citation APA Style 7:

Setiyawati, E. (2025). Prolonged Village Leadership, Elite Conflict, and Governance Breakdown: A Qualitative Study of Political Dynamics in Sontang Village, Rokan Hulu, Indonesia. *Veritas Socialis Et Legalis*, 1(03), 64-69. <https://doi.org/10.53905/Veritas.v1i03.9>

Received: February 05, 2025 | Accepted: April 03, 2025 | Published: April 10, 2025.

## INTRODUCTION

Village governance constitutes one of the most strategic arenas for observing the quality of democracy, decentralisation, and public accountability at the grassroots level. In Indonesia, the village is not merely an administrative unit but also a social-political space in which authority, public service, local resources, customary relations, and electoral legitimacy intersect. Therefore, leadership succession in village government is an important indicator of whether local democratic institutions function substantively or only formally.

The post-authoritarian decentralisation era was expected to strengthen local participation and reduce the centralistic legacy of the New Order. At the village level, this expectation was reflected in statutory changes ([Government of the Republic of Indonesia, 2005](#); [Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 22 of 1999 concerning Regional Government, 1999](#); [Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 5 of 1979 Concerning Village Government, 1979](#); [Simangunsong, 2016](#)) these instruments emphasised direct election, limitation of tenure, and institutional accountability in village administration. In practice, however, village politics often remains shaped by charismatic authority, elite networks, patron-client relations, informal bargaining, and weak external supervision. Recent scholarship on Indonesian village governance shows that decentralisation can improve participation, but it does not automatically produce accountability. Village meetings and participatory forums may provide channels for citizens to express preferences, yet these forums can fail to discipline village officials when power is concentrated or when elite networks dominate decision-making ([Sen et al., 2014, p. 155](#); [Tsai, 2007](#); [Warren & Visser, 2016, p. 284](#)). Studies on clientelism in Indonesia further demonstrate that informal networks, state dependency, and local resource control can shape access to public authority and influence

the quality of local governance.

The political dynamics in Sontang Village, Bonai Darussalam Subdistrict, Rokan Hulu Regency, are significant because the village experienced a prolonged leadership period under Arisman Son PH from 1990 to 2011. For approximately twenty-one years, leadership turnover was not conducted through regular democratic contestation as expected by the evolving legal framework. The case eventually produced political polarisation, public dissatisfaction, elite mobilisation, and dualism in village administration (Antlöv, 2003; Nurhadi & Fauzan, 2024)

The central problem of this study is the gap between the normative design of village democracy and the empirical reality of prolonged authority at the village level. Normatively, leadership succession should be conducted through direct election, limited tenure, and institutional supervision. Empirically, Sontang Village experienced repeated extensions of leadership, weak institutional checks, declining public trust, and conflict between pro-government and opposition groups. This gap reveals the fragility of village-level democratic consolidation when legal rules are not consistently enforced.

Based on this problem, the study addresses two research questions: (1) How did the political dynamics of the Sontang village head leadership develop during 1990-2011? (2) What internal and external factors caused these political dynamics? The study contributes to local politics and village-governance scholarship by providing an empirically grounded explanation of how prolonged tenure, elite contestation, weak supervision, and public-service dissatisfaction can interact to produce governance conflict.

## MATERIALS AND METHODS

### Research Design

This study used a qualitative descriptive case-study design. The design was selected because the research problem concerns political processes, leadership practices, institutional interactions, and conflict narratives that cannot be adequately explained through numerical measurement alone. The case-study approach enabled an in-depth reconstruction of the leadership dynamics in Sontang Village from 1990 to 2011.

### Research Site and Period of Analysis

The research site was Sontang Village, Bonai Darussalam Subdistrict, Rokan Hulu Regency, Riau Province, Indonesia. The temporal scope of analysis covered the period from 1990, when Arisman Son PH became village head, to 2011, when the leadership crisis culminated in resignation, mediation, and preparation for democratic election.

### Data Sources and Informants

The study used primary and secondary data. Primary data were obtained through in-depth interviews and field observations. Informants consisted of village officials, members or former members of village consultative institutions, community leaders, representatives of pro- and contra-government groups, and local-government actors involved in the conflict process. Secondary data included village records, statutory regulations, official documents, meeting notes, media information, and academic literature on leadership, power, conflict, decentralisation, and village governance.

### Data Collection Procedures

Data collection was conducted through three procedures. First, semi-structured interviews were used to obtain narratives about leadership succession, public service, elite relations, conflict escalation, and mediation. Second, documentary review was conducted on legal instruments and village documents related to leadership tenure, village administration, and conflict resolution. Third, field observation was used to understand the social setting, administrative conditions, and interaction patterns among actors. Each interview was guided by core questions but allowed probing to capture contextual details.

### Data Analysis

Data were analysed using a qualitative interactive procedure consisting of data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing. The analysis began by organising data chronologically into four leadership phases: 1990-1998, 1998-2004, 2004-2010, and 2010-2011. The data were then coded thematically into leadership style, power concentration, public service, elite conflict, regulatory inconsistency, and government supervision. Triangulation was applied by comparing interview narratives with documentary evidence and regulatory provisions. The final interpretation was developed by connecting empirical patterns with concepts of leadership, power, authority, conflict, participation, and local governance.

### Trustworthiness and Ethical Considerations

Trustworthiness was ensured through source triangulation, document triangulation, chronological verification, and consistency checking across informants. Ethical principles were applied by explaining the purpose of the study to informants, using the data only for academic purposes, and avoiding unnecessary disclosure of sensitive personal information beyond what is required to explain public political events.

Table 1. Research Design and Reproducibility Matrix

Component	Operationalisation	Reproducibility Procedure
Research approach	Qualitative descriptive case study	Use the same case boundary: Sontang Village leadership, 1990-2011.
Unit of analysis	Political dynamics of village-head leadership	Code events by leadership phase and by actor category.
Primary data	Interviews and field observations	Interview village officials, BPD/LKMD actors, community leaders, pro-contra groups, and local-government actors.
Secondary data	Regulations, village documents, meeting notes, literature	Compare statutory rules with empirical leadership practices.
Analysis technique	Chronological and thematic coding	Code data into leadership style, power, public service, elite interests, regulation, supervision, conflict.
Validation	Triangulation and consistency checking	Cross-check interview accounts with documents and multiple informants.

## RESULTS

### Chronology of Leadership Dynamics

The political dynamics of Sontang Village leadership developed gradually. In the first phase, Arisman Son PH obtained leadership legitimacy through acclamation because no alternative candidate emerged. His charisma and social influence enabled him to become a dominant figure. In the second phase, the expected democratic leadership turnover did not occur when the initial term ended. Instead, local actors proposed extension, and the leadership continued without competitive election. In the third phase, contestation increased as public trust weakened and disagreements emerged regarding decision-making, public service, and the absence of regular succession. In the fourth phase, conflict escalated through issue framing, formation of pro- and contra-government forums, mass mobilisation, creation of a rival village administration, mediation, and resignation (Eikelenboom & Long, 2022, p. 55; Kraemer et al., 2013, p. 839; Yasmi et al., 2009, p. 104)

Table 2. Political Dynamics by Leadership Period

Period	Main event	Dominant political pattern	Implication
1990-1998	Election by acclamation due to the absence of alternative candidates.	Charismatic legitimacy and elite consensus.	Leadership was accepted but depended strongly on personal authority.
1998-2004	Expected succession did not occur; leadership was extended without direct election.	Institutional bypassing and informal agreement.	Democratic renewal weakened and precedent for prolonged tenure emerged.
2004-2010	Public distrust and elite disagreement increased.	Fragmentation between supportive and oppositional groups.	Leadership legitimacy declined and conflict potential increased.
2010-2011	Issue mobilisation, rival administration, mediation, and resignation.	Open contestation and governance dualism.	Administrative disorder occurred and democratic election became unavoidable.

### Internal Factors Causing Political Dynamics

Four internal factors were identified. First, the leadership style became increasingly centralised, especially in decision-making processes that were perceived as insufficiently deliberative (Elomäki et al., 2022, p. 90; Jun & Minas, 2023, p. 13). Second, the prolonged concentration of power weakened institutional renewal and encouraged resistance (Becker et al., 2016, p. 1017; Elomäki et al., 2022, p. 90). Third, public-service responsiveness declined because the village head was perceived as less present in day-to-day administration (Lebel et al., 2006, p. 12). Fourth, the conflict was intensified by competing interests among local elites seeking influence over village authority, customary institutions, cooperatives, and development resources (Kamoto et al., 2013, p. 301; Voors et al., 2017, p. 5862).

### External Factors Causing Political Dynamics

Two external factors shaped the escalation of conflict. First, district and subdistrict authorities were inconsistent in implementing village-governance regulations, particularly concerning leadership tenure and direct election (Lebel et al., 2006, p. 12; Subanda et al., 2020, p. 55). Second, supervision and guidance from local government were weak, allowing administrative dualism and political polarisation to persist (Grady et al., 2016, p. 2153). The absence of timely intervention transformed a leadership-succession issue into a broader governance crisis.

Table 3. Internal and External Factors

Factor type	Specific factor	Empirical indication	Governance implication
Internal	Centralised leadership style	Decision-making was perceived as one-sided and insufficiently deliberative.	Reduced public trust and weakened participatory legitimacy.
Internal	Prolonged power concentration	Leadership continued for approximately twenty-one years without regular competitive renewal.	Created resistance, elite rivalry, and perception of authoritarian tendency.
Internal	Public-service decline	The village head was perceived as less active in administrative service.	Increased dissatisfaction and strengthened opposition narratives.
Internal	Elite interest conflict	Pro- and contra-groups competed over leadership, village apparatus, KUD, customary authority, and partnership land.	Transformed administrative disagreement into political mobilisation.
External	Regulatory inconsistency	Legal rules on tenure and direct election were not consistently enforced.	Produced a gap between formal law and local practice.
External	Weak supervision	District/subdistrict responses were delayed and insufficient.	Allowed dualism and conflict escalation.

### Dualism of Village Administration

One of the most significant outcomes was the emergence of dualism in village administration. The rival structure challenged the legitimacy of the official village apparatus and disrupted administrative order (Vel & Bedner, 2015, p. 496). Although some lower-level positions remained the same, several strategic posts such as secretary, government affairs, general affairs, development affairs, BPD chair, hamlet heads, and RW heads had competing versions. This dualism indicates that the conflict was no longer limited to leadership opinion but had entered the institutional structure of village governance (Dedi, 2013, p. 77; Mukaddar et al., 2021, p. 149).




Figure 1. Conceptual mechanism of political leadership dynamics in Sontang Village.

## DISCUSSION

The findings indicate that political dynamics in Sontang Village were produced by the interaction between personal authority, institutional weakness, elite competition, and inconsistent government supervision. The initial leadership legitimacy was built on charisma and social recognition. However, charisma became problematic when it was not balanced by institutionalised succession and accountable decision-making. This pattern corresponds with the broader literature on Indonesian local politics, which shows that informal authority and elite networks can persist even after formal democratic reforms (Jati et al., 2026; Sirimorok et al., 2023, p. 423)

The case also demonstrates that direct-election rules are insufficient when not accompanied by enforcement, supervision, and participatory accountability. Antlöv et al. (2016) argue that village governance reform was designed to address weaknesses in decentralisation by improving governance arrangements and reducing capture by special interests. The Sontang case shows the opposite condition: weak implementation allowed the concentration of power and created space for elite contestation. Similarly, Haryanto et al. (2025) show that participation can exist without effective accountability. This is reflected in Sontang, where community aspirations and forums existed but did not immediately produce institutional correction (Sen et al., 2014, p. 155).

The role of elite mobilisation is also central. The opposition to the village head was not merely a spontaneous expression of public dissatisfaction; it was shaped by organised interests and competing actors. This finding is consistent with scholarship on clientelism and local governance in Indonesia, which emphasises the importance of informal networks, state dependency, and access to resources in shaping political behaviour. Berenschot (2018) and Berenschot & Mulder (2019) show that clientelistic practices are closely related to local governance quality. In Sontang, contestation over leadership, village apparatus, cooperative management, customary authority, and partnership land reveals how political conflict may expand when authority is linked to resource distribution.

The findings have several implications. First, village-head tenure limits must be enforced not only as administrative rules but also as democratic safeguards (Lebel et al., 2006, p. 12; M. et al., 2009, p. 186). Second, village consultative institutions such as BPD must function as effective checks rather than passive observers. Third, subdistrict and district governments need early-warning mechanisms for leadership disputes, particularly when signs of polarisation, public-service decline, and administrative dualism emerge (Fauzan et al., 2025). Fourth, conflict mediation should be conducted before mobilisation becomes institutional dualism (Zaenuddin, 2025).

This study has limitations. It is a single-case qualitative study, so the findings cannot be statistically generalised to all villages in Indonesia. The study relies on retrospective accounts of events between 1990 and 2011, which may contain memory bias. Nevertheless, triangulation of narratives, documents, regulations, and chronological reconstruction strengthens the credibility of the findings (Claus & Tracey, 2019, p. 985; Yuliani et al., 2018, p. 5). Future research should compare multiple villages with similar prolonged leadership patterns to identify whether the mechanisms found in Sontang operate more broadly across Indonesian rural governance.

## CONCLUSION

This study concludes that the political dynamics of the Sontang village head leadership during 1990-2011 were caused by the interaction of internal and external factors. Internally, centralised leadership, prolonged concentration of power, declining public-service responsiveness, and elite interest conflict eroded legitimacy and intensified resistance. Externally, inconsistent

implementation of regulations and weak supervision by district and subdistrict authorities allowed the conflict to escalate into administrative dualism.

The evidence supports the argument introduced at the beginning of the article: village democracy requires more than formal legal provisions. It requires institutional enforcement, leadership renewal, participatory decision-making, and responsive public service. The Sontang case highlights the potential impact of unresolved leadership succession on public trust, administrative stability, and local democratic consolidation. The authors suggest that village governments, BPD, subdistrict authorities, and district governments strengthen periodic leadership evaluation, transparent succession mechanisms, conflict mediation procedures, and public-service accountability to prevent similar crises in the future.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors express appreciation to all informants, community members, village officials, and local-government actors who provided information and contextual clarification for this study. Appreciation is also extended to academic colleagues who contributed constructive comments during the preparation of this manuscript.

## CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest regarding the research, authorship, or publication of this article.

## REFERENCES

- Antlöv, H. (2003). Village Government and Rural Development In Indonesia: The New Democratic Framework. *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, 39(2), 193–214. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00074910302013>
- Antlöv, H., Wetterberg, A., & Dharmawan, L. (2016). Village Governance, Community Life, and the 2014 Village Law in Indonesia. *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, 52(2), 161–183. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2015.1129047>
- Becker, S., Bauer, M. W., Connolly, S., & Kassim, H. (2016). The Commission: boxed in and constrained, but still an engine of integration. *UEA Digital Repository (University of East Anglia)*, 39(5), 1011–1031. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2016.1181870>
- Berenschot, W. (2018). The Political Economy of Clientelism: A Comparative Study of Indonesia's Patronage Democracy. *Comparative Political Studies*, 51(12), 1563–1593. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414018758756>
- Berenschot, W., & Mulder, P. (2019). Explaining regional variation in local governance: Clientelism and state-dependency in Indonesia. *KNAW Research Portal (Royal Academy of Art and Sciences (KNAW))*, 122, 233–244. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2019.05.021>
- Claus, L., & Tracey, P. (2019). Making Change from Behind a Mask: How Organizations Challenge Guarded Institutions by Sparking Grassroots Activism. *Academy of Management Journal*, 63(4), 965–996. <https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2017.0507>
- Dedi, S. (2013). Selling the Sea: A study of conflict over marine tenure in Kei Islands, Eastern Indonesia. In *ANU Press eBooks*. ANU Press. [https://doi.org/10.26530/oapen\\_459922](https://doi.org/10.26530/oapen_459922)
- Eikelenboom, M., & Long, T. B. (2022). Breaking the Cycle of Marginalization: How to Involve Local Communities in Multi-stakeholder Initiatives? *Journal of Business Ethics*, 186(1), 31–62. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-022-05252-5>
- Elomäki, A., Gaweda, B., & Berthet, V. (2022). Democratic Practices and Political Dynamics of Intra-Group Policy Formation in the European Parliament. In *Palgrave studies in European Union politics* (pp. 73–96). Springer International Publishing. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94012-6\\_4](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94012-6_4)
- Fauzan, M., Prasajo, H., Ardhanariswari, R., & Elfudlatsani, B. (2025). Balancing Power and Resolving Conflicts in the Collaboration between Regional Heads and DPRD in Indonesia's Decentralized Governance. *E3S Web of Conferences*, 609, 7004–7004. <https://doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/202560907004>
- Government of the Republic of Indonesia. (2005). *Government Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia Number 72 of 2005 concerning Villages*.
- Grady, A., Gersonius, B., & Makarigakis, A. (2016). Taking stock of decentralized disaster risk reduction in Indonesia. *Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences*, 16(9), 2145–2157. <https://doi.org/10.5194/nhess-16-2145-2016>
- Haryanto, H., Berenschot, W., & Aspinall, E. (2025). Participation without accountability: deliberative democracy in village Indonesia. *South East Asia Research*, 33(1), 49–67. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0967828x.2025.2483162>
- Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 22 of 1999 concerning Regional Government, (1999).
- Jati, W. R., Rahmiati, D., Halimatusa'diah, Maulana, I., & Syamsurijal. (2026). The Interplay of Religion, Ethnicity, and Politics: The Power Contestation between Old and New Informal Actors in Madura, Indonesia. *Pertanika Journal of Social Science & Humanities*, 34(1). <https://doi.org/10.47836/pjssh.34.1.15>
- Jun, U., & Minas, M. (2023). Power struggles in the German Christian Democrats. The dynamics of three consecutive leadership contests. *Frontiers in Political Science*, 5. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2023.1039547>
- Kamoto, J., Clarkson, G., Dorward, P., & Shepherd, D. (2013). Doing more harm than good? Community based natural resource management and the neglect of local institutions in policy development. *Land Use Policy*, 35, 293–301. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2013.06.002>
- Kraemer, R., Whiteman, G., & Banerjee, S. B. (2013). Conflict and Astroturfing in Niyamgiri: The Importance of National Advocacy Networks in Anti-Corporate Social Movements. *Organization Studies*, 34, 823–852. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840613479240>
- Lebel, L., Anderies, J. M., Campbell, B., Folke, C., Hatfield-Dodds, S., Hughes, T. P., & Wilson, J. A. (2006). Governance and the Capacity to Manage Resilience in Regional Social-Ecological Systems. *Ecology and Society*, 11(1).

- <https://doi.org/10.5751/es-01606-110119>
- M., U., Janine, J., H., A., & Willem, A. (2009). Legalising Land Rights : Local Practices, State Responses and Tenure Security in Africa, Asia and Latin America. In *Leiden Repository (Leiden University)*. Leiden University. <https://doi.org/10.5117/9789087280567>
- Mukaddar, M., Umanailo, M. C. B., Radjak, D. A., Lionardo, A., & Handayani, N. (2021). Working Relations of the Village Head and the Village Consultative Body in the Village Funds Utilization. *Jurnal Administrasi Publik Public Administration Journal*, 11(2), 144–151. <https://doi.org/10.31289/jap.v11i2.5340>
- Nurhadi, S., & Fauzan, F. H. (2024). Political Stability Versus Local Oligarchy. *Jurnal Politik Pemerintahan Dharma Praja*, 17(2), 33–46. <https://doi.org/10.33701/jppdp.v17i2.4813>
- Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 5 of 1979 concerning Village Government, (1979).
- Sen, K., Bukenya, B., & Badru, B. (2014). The Politics of Inclusive Development. In *Econstor (Econstor)*. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722564.001.0001>
- Simangunsong, F. (2016). *UU NO. 32 Tahun 2004 Tentang Pemerintahan Daerah*. <http://eprints.ipdn.ac.id/2690/>
- Sirimorok, N., Fisher, M. R., Verheijen, B., & Sahide, M. A. K. (2023). Placing the Commoning First: Getting Beyond the Patronage Trap in Natural Resource Decentralization Policies. *Forest and Society*, 7(2), 412–434. <https://doi.org/10.24259/fs.v7i2.25926>
- Subanda, I. N., Budiana, I. N., & Gorda, A. A. Ngr. E. S. (2020). The Implications of Village Regulation toward the Dualism of Local Leadership Dynamics. *Udayana Journal of Law and Culture*, 4(1), 39–39. <https://doi.org/10.24843/ujlc.2020.v04.i01.p03>
- Tsai, L. L. (2007). Accountability And Village Democratic Reforms. In *Cambridge University Press eBooks* (pp. 187–227). Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511800115.007>
- Vel, J. A. C., & Bedner, A. (2015). Decentralisation and village governance in Indonesia: the return to thenagariand the 2014 Village Law. *The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law*, 47(3), 493–507. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07329113.2015.1109379>
- Voors, M., Turley, T., Bulte, E., Kontoleon, A., & List, J. A. (2017). Chief for a Day: Elite Capture and Management Performance in a Field Experiment in Sierra Leone. *Management Science*, 64(12), 5855–5876. <https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2866>
- Warren, C. F. S., & Visser, L. (2016). The Local Turn: an Introductory Essay Revisiting Leadership, Elite Capture and Good Governance in Indonesian Conservation and Development Programs. *Human Ecology*, 44(3), 277–286. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10745-016-9831-z>
- Yasmi, Y., Guernier, J., & Colfer, C. J. P. (2009). Positive and negative aspects of forestry conflict: lessons from a decentralized forest management in Indonesia. *The International Forestry Review*, 11(1), 98–110. <https://doi.org/10.1505/ifer.11.1.98>
- Yuliani, L., Jong, E. B. P. de, Knippenberg, L., Bakara, D. O., Salim, M., & Sunderland, T. (2018). Keeping the land: indigenous communities&#8217; struggle over land use and sustainable forest management in Kalimantan, Indonesia. *Ecology and Society*, 23(4). <https://doi.org/10.5751/es-10640-230449>
- Zaenuddin, M. (2025). How to Achieve the Integration from the Dualism of Institutional Conflicts? Lesson Learned from Batam, Indonesia. *SAGE Open*, 15(3). <https://doi.org/10.1177/21582440251365467>