Institutional Capacity, Interagency Coordination, and Enforcement Integrity in Street Vendor Governance: Explaining the Failure of Coaching-Based Regulation in Indonesia

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ABSTRACT

Purpose of the study: : Local governments in developing countries increasingly rely on coaching (pembinaan) — the combination of extension (penyuluhan), direction (pengarahan), and guidance (bimbingan) — as a soft-governance instrument to formalize street vendors without resorting solely to eviction. This study examines the role performed by the Market Service (Dinas Pasar) of Pekanbaru City in coaching street vendors (pedagang kaki lima, PKL) at Senapelan Market, and identifies the factors that constrain the effectiveness of that role.

Methodology: A qualitative descriptive case-study design was employed. Data were collected through semi-structured interviews with one key informant (the Head of the Market Service Technical Implementation Unit) and eight informants (three Market Service staff and five street vendors, selected through purposive sampling), complemented by direct field observation and documentary review. Data were analyzed using the interactive qualitative model of data condensation, display, and conclusion drawing/verification.

Results: The coaching role of the Market Service has not been optimally implemented across all three indicators — extension, direction, and guidance — as evidenced by the persistence of vendors trading on sidewalks and road bodies despite repeated interventions. Three interrelated factors constrain this role: (a) the limited service capacity of Market Service personnel, (b) weak inter-unit coordination and communication, and (c) inconsistent integrity/enforcement discipline among field officers.

Conclusions: Coaching outcomes at Senapelan Market remain suboptimal because instrumental (extension, direction, guidance) and institutional (capacity, coordination, integrity) dimensions of local governance are misaligned; strengthening officer capacity, inter-agency coordination, and consistent, transparent enforcement — alongside vendor-inclusive relocation planning — is required to translate coaching policy into behavioral compliance.

Keywords:
street vendor governance; local government coaching; informal economy; market management; public administration; qualitative case study.

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INTRODUCTION

Contextual Framework

The informal sector absorbs a substantial share of urban labor across the developing world, and street vending is its most visible manifestation. In South and Southeast Asia alone, more than half of urban employment is estimated to lie within the informal economy, with street vending recognized as its most common livelihood form (Al-Kindi Publisher, 2024; Jian et al., 2023, p. 1; Roever & Skinner, 2016). Street vendors typically emerge not by choice but as a survival response to constrained access to formal employment (Al-Kindi Publisher, 2024). While municipal authorities frequently frame the occupation of sidewalks and road bodies as a disorder requiring correction (Al-Kindi Publisher, 2024), contemporary urban studies highlight a "public space paradox": top-down regulatory frameworks intended to organize urban environments often fail to recognize that street vending is integral to the city's economic and social fabric (Aliaga-Linares, 2018, p. 665; Claghorn, 2018; Rahayu et al., 2025). Consequently, the relationship between governance and street vending is frequently more nuanced than formal regulations suggest, characterized by uneven enforcement and "vernacular governance"—a process of constant, street-level negotiation where vendors' presence is often permitted or tolerated rather than strictly prohibited, as authorities struggle to balance competing public interests (Medina et al., 2022; Pulliat et al., 2023).

Pekanbaru, the capital of Riau Province, Indonesia, exemplifies this acute tension. Senapelan Market — one of the city's oldest traditional markets — has long attracted vendors who trade along its adjoining roads rather than inside the officially provided kiosks and stalls. This spatial preference often stems from the economic necessity of operating at the high-traffic nexus of public activity, which is crucial for maximizing daily sales. The Pekanbaru City Government, through its Market Service, has issued regulations and conducted periodic evictions, yet vendor presence on public thoroughfares persists. This reveals a recurring cycle of spatial contestation that complicates traffic flow and public order, underscoring the limitations of relying solely on exclusionary policies without addressing the underlying drivers of informal livelihood strategies (Rahayu et al., 2025).

Critical Examination of Existing Literature

Two broad governance responses to street vending dominate the international literature: coercive control and developmental coaching. Evidence from China demonstrates that where formal governance is weak or inconsistently enforced, vendors construct their own private-governance arrangements to allocate space and resist state interference (Jiang & Wang, 2021), suggesting that top-down control alone rarely produces durable compliance. Comparative Southeast Asian evidence similarly indicates that eviction-centered policy tends to reproduce cycles of displacement and poverty rather than resolving the underlying livelihood pressures that drive vending (Al-Kindi Publisher, 2024). Recent research further clarifies that coercive interventions, such as forced relocation, often fail to account for vendor agency or spatial dynamics, thereby exacerbating economic vulnerability and disrupting crucial social networks (Hendri, 2025). Moreover, such exclusionary policies can create a "legitimacy trap," wherein enforcement disproportionately targets vendors willing to comply with formal regulations while failing to effectively govern those actively skirting the law (Farah, 2026).

Indonesian studies converge on a diagnosis that policy failure in street-vendor management is rooted less in the design of regulation than in its implementation. Sethuraman's classic account attributes such failures to a supply-side orientation in which regulation and assistance are designed without genuine communication or cooperation with vendors themselves, implementation processes crowded with successive layers of “coaching” officers whose roles overlap, and enforcement logics driven more by project completion than by a genuine spirit of building the informal economy as a base of people's welfare (Kurniadi & Ibrahim, 2023). Related work confirms that the ineffectiveness of vendor-empowerment policy is frequently attributable to limited apparatus capacity, bureaucratic rather than aspiration-responsive implementation styles, and a frequent misalignment between policy demands and the socio-economic realities of vendors (Kurniadi & Ibrahim, 2023; Setijohadi et al., 2026).

More broadly, the capacity of local government officials to manage resources and make sound operational decisions has been shown to directly shape the quality of public services delivered to communities (Madjid, 2024), while institutional coordination, leadership activity, and stakeholder engagement are identified as central levers of effective local governance (Madjid, 2024; Simarmata et al., 2026). Cross-national evidence from Pakistan further shows that local collaborative governance is significantly associated with institutional capacity building and, through it, with the quality of public service delivery (din et al., 2023). Consequently, contemporary urban studies increasingly advocate for "livelihood-sensitive" and participatory governance models that prioritize dialogue, stakeholder integration, and empowerment over mere exclusionary control (HT et al., 2026; Setijohadi et al., 2026).

Identification of Research Gaps

Despite this literature, three gaps remain salient. First, most street-vendor governance studies emphasize either policy design (regulatory/legal analysis) or vendor livelihood strategies, while comparatively few examine the coaching (pembinaan) role of the implementing technical unit itself as a distinct object of empirical inquiry. Second, existing Indonesian case studies on street-vendor management in Pekanbaru have concentrated on policy planning and implementation of regional regulations (Perda) rather than disaggregating coaching into its constituent behavioral indicators — extension, direction, and guidance — to determine which specific dimension underperforms. Third, the factors that inhibit coaching effectiveness are often asserted rather than empirically traced to the operational level of a single market unit through triangulated qualitative evidence.

Rationale for the Research

Addressing these gaps matters both academically and practically. Academically, disaggregating “coaching” into measurable behavioral indicators contributes a finer-grained framework for evaluating soft-governance instruments in informal-economy management. Practically, Senapelan Market's persistent non-compliance despite years of policy attention makes it a critical case for identifying where, specifically, the coaching chain breaks down — information that is directly actionable for the Pekanbaru City Government and transferable to comparable secondary cities managing informal trade.

Objectives

This study aims to: (1) describe the role of the Market Service of Pekanbaru City in coaching street vendors at Senapelan Market, assessed through the indicators of extension, direction, and guidance; and (2) identify the factors that inhibit the effective performance of that coaching role.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

Study Participants

Participants were selected using purposive sampling, appropriate for qualitative designs in which participants are treated as sources of information (narasumber/informants) rather than as a statistical sample. Two participant categories were defined:

Key informant (n = 1): the Head of the Market Service Technical Implementation Unit (UPT), selected because this position holds primary operational authority over, and accountability for, vendor coaching at Senapelan Market.

Informants (n = 8): three Market Service staff members directly involved in field coaching activities, and five street vendors operating at or around Senapelan Market, selected to represent variation in trading location (inside allocated kiosks/los vs. roadside) and length of trading tenure.

Table 1. Key Informant and Informant Composition

No.	Position	n	Category
1	Head, Market Service UPT	1	Key informant
2	Market Service UPT staff	3	Informant
3	Street vendors (PKL)	5	Informant
	Total	9	

Study Organization

Data Sources

Two data types were collected. Primary data were obtained directly from the field through informant responses concerning (i) respondent identity/background and (ii) the barriers experienced in implementing market coaching and retribution collection. Secondary data were obtained from Market Service administrative records and library research, covering the general profile of the Market Service, staff establishment figures, and staff education levels.

Data Collection Techniques

Three data collection techniques were triangulated:

1. Semi-structured interviews — direct communication with respondents/participants to obtain information relevant to the research object.
2. Direct observation — on-site observation at Senapelan Market to verify vendor trading locations and behavior against interview accounts.
3. Documentation — collection of institutional documents, regulations, and archival records held by the Market Service.

Research Instrument and Indicators

Coaching was operationalized following the framework of three indicators, each assessed through interview and observation:

Table 2. Operational Definition of the Coaching Construct

Indicator	Dimension (sub-indicator)
1. Extension (Penyuluhan)	(a) lectures/talks; (b) motivation
2. Direction (Pengarahan)	(a) directing vendors not to trade on roadsides; (b) informing the hazards of roadside trading; (c) informing sanctions for violations
3. Guidance (Bimbingan)	(a) mental guidance; (b) skills guidance

Data on inhibiting factors were organized around three a priori categories derived from the pilot interviews and prior literature: apparatus service capacity, inter-officer coordination/communication, and officer integrity.

Trustworthiness

Credibility was supported through method triangulation (interview, observation, documentation) and source triangulation (key informant, staff informants, vendor informants representing differing trading positions). Because the key informant held sanctioning authority, vendor informants were interviewed separately to reduce social-desirability bias in their accounts of coaching effectiveness.

Ethical Considerations

Participation was voluntary, and informants were informed of the study's academic purpose prior to interview. No identifying personal data beyond position/role are reported in this article.

Statistical Analysis

Data were analyzed using a descriptive qualitative method. Following transcription, data were grouped by indicator, reduced to salient statements, displayed in narrative and tabular form, and interpreted against the operational indicators in Table 2 to draw conclusions regarding the optimality of the coaching role. Data from interviews, observation, and documentation were triangulated to corroborate findings and reduce single-source bias. This procedure is consistent with descriptive qualitative approaches used in comparable Indonesian local-government studies (Aryani et al., 2023).

RESULTS

The Coaching Role of the Market Service

Findings are presented objectively by indicator, drawing on interview, observation, and documentary evidence.

Extension

Field evidence indicated that extension activities — lectures/talks and motivational engagement intended to encourage voluntary relocation to designated kiosks — were conducted irregularly rather than as a sustained program. Vendor informants reported limited recall of structured extension sessions, while staff informants acknowledged that extension activity was concentrated around periods preceding enforcement operations rather than delivered as ongoing engagement.

Direction

Direction activities — instructing vendors not to trade on road bodies, communicating the hazards of roadside trading, and informing vendors of applicable sanctions — were observed to occur, but their behavioral effect was limited. Several vendor informants reported having received verbal direction and sanction warnings on multiple occasions without a change in trading location, indicating a gap between message delivery and behavioral compliance.

Guidance

Mental and skills guidance activities were the least evident of the three indicators in field observation. Vendor informants did not report receiving structured mental or skills-based guidance connected to formal relocation into kiosks or los.

Table 3. Summary Assessment of Coaching Indicators at Senapelan Market

Indicator	Observed Implementation	Vendor Behavioral Response
Extension	Irregular, event-driven	Low recall / limited engagement
Direction	Present but repetitive	Warnings received; location unchanged
Guidance	Minimal / largely absent	No reported effect

Across all three indicators, the consistent finding is that the Market Service's coaching role at Senapelan Market has not been optimally implemented. This is most directly evidenced by the persistence of vendors trading on the sidewalk and road body up to the time of the study, despite repeated direction and sanction communication (see 3.1.2).

3.2 Factors Affecting the Coaching Role

Three interrelated inhibiting factors emerged from the data, consistent with the a priori categories in Section 2.6.

(a) Apparatus service capacity. Informants indicated that the number and skill preparation of Market Service field personnel were insufficient relative to the scale and dispersion of vendor activity around Senapelan Market, limiting the frequency and consistency of coaching contact.

(b) Coordination and communication. Staff informants described inconsistent coordination between the Market Service UPT and other relevant city units (e.g., public order/enforcement units), producing gaps between direction/warning activity and follow-through enforcement — a pattern consistent with findings elsewhere that active inter-unit coordination is a precondition for translating directives into improved service or compliance outcomes (Tambaip et al., 2026).

(c) Officer integrity. Several informants — both staff and vendors — described inconsistent application of sanctions, which vendor informants interpreted as reducing the credibility of direction and sanction warnings over repeated cycles.

Table 4. Inhibiting Factors and Their Manifestation

Factor	Manifestation in the Field
Apparatus capacity	Insufficient personnel/skills relative to vendor dispersion; irregular extension coverage
Coordination/communication	Weak linkage between Market Service direction activity and enforcement follow-through
Integrity	Inconsistent sanction application; erosion of warning credibility

Significant Findings

The most significant finding is that coaching underperformance is not attributable to a single failure point but to a compounding chain: limited apparatus capacity constrains the delivery of extension and guidance; weak coordination disconnects direction/warning activity from enforcement consequence; and inconsistent integrity undermines vendor trust in whatever direction is delivered — jointly explaining why vendors continue trading on public thoroughfares despite years of policy attention.

DISCUSSION

Interpreting the Outcomes

The finding that extension and guidance were the weakest-performing indicators, while direction was present but behaviorally ineffective, suggests that the Market Service's coaching activity has skewed toward informational and warning-based communication at the expense of substantive developmental components. Theoretically, effective coaching distinguishes itself from mere enforcement by emphasizing capacity building, empowerment, and genuine dialogue (Bachkirova & Borrington, 2018, p. 342; HT et al., 2026; Jones et al., 2015, p. 256). Instead, the observed implementation mirrored a "soft eviction" approach, where coaching is utilized primarily as a precursor to regulatory control rather than a mechanism for sustainable integration (Berthou & Buch, 2018, p. 36; Hermawati & Paskarina, 2017; Onifade et al., 2024, p. 2875)

This skewed pattern reinforces a broader critique that vendor management policies are frequently designed and delivered in a supply-side, top-down manner. Such approaches often prioritize institutional convenience over the complex socio-economic realities of vendors, failing to engage them as active partners in the governance process (Andriansyah, 2016; Kurniadi & Ibrahim, 2023). Consequently, when directions lack tangible benefits—such as viable, accessible relocation sites or practical business development assistance—vendors often perceive them as lacking legitimacy, leading them to prioritize immediate livelihood needs over compliance (Farah, 2026; Simarmata et al., 2026). Thus, the disconnect between message delivery and behavioral compliance is not merely an execution failure but a structural misalignment between top-down regulatory goals and the pragmatic survival strategies employed by informal vendors.

Evaluation in Relation to Antecedent Studies

These results are consistent with, and extend, prior Pekanbaru-focused studies on street-vendor policy, which similarly report the persistent failure to implement control and empowerment policies despite the existence of formal regulatory instruments. While antecedent research has largely emphasized the limitations of regional-regulation implementation, the present study specifically highlights how these failures manifest through coaching indicators. The observed weakness in inter-unit coordination is strongly echoed in cross-national evidence, which identifies institutional capacity building as a critical mediator for effective local collaborative governance (Börk & Hirokawa, 2021, p. 10; din et al., 2023, p. 3). In this view, formal policies often fail because they lack the necessary operational infrastructure—including trained personnel and cohesive inter-agency networks—required to translate directives into improved service delivery quality (Tambaip et al., 2026). Furthermore, the findings regarding officer integrity directly corroborate broader governance literature which posits that accountability and consistency in enforcement are essential pillars of good governance, operating alongside capacity and coordination to maintain institutional trust (Alfano & Ercolano, 2021, p. 103; Madjid, 2024; Stupak et al., 2021, p. 26). The negative impact of erratic enforcement is further illuminated by evidence from China, indicating that when governance signals appear inconsistent, informal actors—such as street vendors—rationally bypass state direction in favor of self-organized coping arrangements (Caron, 2013, p. 29; Jiang & Wang, 2021; Kamp, 2023). This suggests that the persistence of roadside trading despite official intervention is not merely a failure of vendor compliance, but an outcome of a "legitimacy trap," wherein inconsistent enforcement erodes the perceived credibility of the state, compelling vendors to prioritize immediate survival over adherence to regulatory goals (Farah, 2026; Nogueira, 2021, p. 868; Yesmin & Olvera, 2024, p. 189).

Ramifications of the Findings

The compounding-chain interpretation (Section 3.3) has a practical implication: incremental improvements to any single factor in isolation — for example, more frequent extension sessions without corresponding coordination or consistent enforcement — are unlikely to shift vendor behavior. Improving coaching outcomes at Senapelan Market plausibly requires simultaneous attention to apparatus capacity, cross-unit coordination, and consistent, transparent sanction application, alongside addressing the underlying economic drivers (kiosk/los rental costs, facility adequacy) that make roadside trading a rational vendor choice in the first place.

Limitations

This study has several limitations. First, as a single-site case study with a small, purposively selected informant pool (n = 9), findings are context-bound to Senapelan Market and are not statistically generalizable to other markets or cities, though analytical transfer to comparable contexts is plausible. Second, self-reported interview data are subject to recall and social-desirability bias, particularly for vendor informants describing their compliance history to a researcher associated with the university rather than the Market Service, and for staff informants describing their own unit's performance. Third, the cross-sectional field period captures coaching activity at a single point in time and cannot establish whether observed patterns have changed following any subsequent policy adjustments. Fourth, the study did not include informants from the coordinating public-order/enforcement unit external to the Market Service itself, limiting direct triangulation of the coordination-failure finding from the partner-agency side.

CONCLUSION

This study set out to describe the role of the Pekanbaru City Market Service in coaching street vendors at Senapelan Market and to identify the factors constraining that role. The evidence shows that the coaching role — assessed through extension, direction, and guidance — has not been optimally carried out, most visibly reflected in the continued presence of vendors trading on sidewalks and road bodies despite sustained direction and sanction communication. This finding directly answers the study's first objective and confirms, rather than merely restates, the concern raised in the introduction that existing municipal policy responses have not translated into behavioral compliance.

Three inhibiting factors — apparatus service capacity, inter-unit coordination and communication, and officer integrity — were identified as jointly, rather than independently, responsible for this shortfall, addressing the study's second objective. Together, these findings underscore that coaching as a governance instrument for informal-sector management is only as effective as the institutional infrastructure — trained personnel, coordinated agencies, and consistent enforcement — that delivers it. For Pekanbaru City and comparable secondary cities, this suggests that policy revision should move beyond restating regulatory obligations toward strengthening the operational conditions of coaching delivery itself, including reconsideration of vendor relocation terms (kiosk/los pricing and facility adequacy) so that formal trading locations become a genuinely viable alternative to the roadside. The authors welcome comments, critiques, and suggestions from readers and fellow researchers to further refine and extend this line of inquiry into street-vendor coaching governance in Indonesian secondary cities.

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CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The author declares no conflict of interest regarding the publication of this article.

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